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THE QUEST FOR “LA SAPIENZA”: ROY BHASKAR’S CRITICAL 
REALISM AND THE SCIENCE AND RELIGION DIALOGUE
Ante JeronČiĆ
Andrews University
In January of  2008, Pope Benedict XVI prepared to deliver an address at 
the “La Sapienza” University of  Rome on the place of  religion in secular 
societies. However, due to the objection of  a number of  students and 
professors, including the entire physics faculty, the university revoked the 
invitation two days before the scheduled event on January 15. As one of  the 
spokespersons against the papal appearance, the physicist Marcello Cini sent 
a missive to the University Rector in which he noted “that since the time 
of  Descartes we have arrived at . . . a partition of  spheres of  competence 
between the Academy and the Church. [The pope’s] clamorous violation . . . 
would have been considered, in the world, as a jump backwards in time of  300 
years and more.”1 For Cini, religion and science present, to invoke Stephen Jay 
Gould, non-overlapping magisteria.2 Consequently, any transgression of  such 
inviolable demarcations, any attempt to even reopen a conversation between 
those two domains of  thinking, amounts to a regressive reactionism.3 On 
1See Paul Newall, “The Pope and the Gallileo Affair,” http://thekindlyones.
org/2010/10/16/the-pope-and-the-galileo-affair/.
I first presented a version of  this article at the interdisciplinary 2013 Andrews 
Autumn Conference on Religion and Science. Much of  the rhetorical structure and 
content aimed for that occasion has been preserved here. Additionally, I remain 
indebted to friends and colleagues whose feedback made an invaluable contribution 
in crafting this article: Vanessa Corredera, Karl Bailey, and L. Monique Pittman. They 
enable me to practice the discourse of  transversality on a weekly basis.
2See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould, “Two Separate Domains,” in Philosophy of  
Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael L. Peterson, et al. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 556.
3Of  course, there were those who condemned the snubbing of  the Pope, 
including the then Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi who contended that “no 
voice should be stifled in our country” (Ian Fisher, “Pope Cancels Speech after 
Protest at University,” The New York Times, January 16 2008, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/01/16/world/europe/16pope.html). Or take Giorgio Israel’s response 
printed on the afternoon of  January 15 in the L’Osservatore Romano. Israel, himself  
a professor in the department of  mathematics at “La Sapienza,” argued that “it is 
surprising that those who have chosen as their motto the famous phrase attributed to 
Voltaire—‘I disapprove of  what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to 
say it’—should oppose the pope’s delivering an address . . . . In this incident there has 
emerged a part of  secular culture that makes no arguments, but demonizes. It does not 
discuss, like true secular culture does, but creates monsters” (Sandro Magister, “The 
University of  Rome Closes Its Doors to the Pope,”
356 Seminary StudieS 53 (autumn 2015)
this count, the very adage of  “faith and science” is oxymoronic at best and 
perilous at worst.
However, as one reads the text of  the ill-fated address it becomes clear 
that Benedict’s intent was not to undermine the role of  science, but rather to 
situate it within a broader conversation of  what constitutes rationality and 
human flourishing.4 As he puts it elsewhere, there is a “necessary relatedness 
between reason and faith and between reason and religion, which are called to 
purify and help one another. They need each other, and they must acknowledge 
this mutual need” as they challenge each other’s pathologies.5 Benedict echoes 
similar concerns in his 2006 Regensburg address “Faith, Reason and the 
University” in which he proffers a sustained critique of  “dehellenization,” 
namely, a critique of  those intellectual tendencies that undermine the 
synthesis of  faith and reason as achieved through the confluence of  Christian 
and Greek thought. Medieval nominalism, Kant’s radicalization of  Protestant 
antimetaphysical impulses, and Adolf  Harnack’s reduction of  the Christian 
message to humanitarian moralism are but some of  the forces that have 
led to the subjectivization and privatization of  faith. Benedict rejects such 
tendencies and instead calls for “courage to engage the whole breadth of  
reason, and not the denial of  its grandeur—this is the programme with which 
a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of  our time.”6 
While I am much less sanguine than the Pope about the all-round 
beneficence of  the “hellenization of  Christianity,” I side with his basic intent 
to articulate a positive relationship between science and religion, and in the 
process provide a nuanced account of  the modes, scope, and responsibilities 
of  rationality. He rightly suggests that the multilayeredness of  reality calls for 
a textured account of  cognition that evades the trappings of  evidentialism, 
scientism, or fideism. In this article I want to elaborate on some of  these 
intuitions via Roy Bhaskar’s critical realist theoretical framework.7 “Intuitions” 
http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/186421?eng=y).
4The ill-fated address itself  was published on January 16, 2008.
5Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas, Dialectics of  Secularization: On 
Reason and Religion, trans. Florian Schuller (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2006), 78. 
6Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and 
Reflections,” 2006 Regensburg Address, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_ 
university-regensburg_en.html.
7Critical realism names a spectrum of  philosophical positions ranging from 
various appropriations of  Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism to different 
Anglo-American approaches from the 1920s onward, including the pioneering work 
of  theologian-scientists such as John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacock, and Ian Barbour. 
For helpful definitions of  critical realism see John C. Polkinghorne, Belief  in God in 
an Age of  Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 105–9, and Ilkka 
Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1–2. 
Niiniluoto lists the following types of  realism: ontological, semantic, epistemological, 
axiological, methodological, and ethical. 
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is the right word here as I have in mind a certain complementarity of  
concerns of  those two thinkers, rather than an overlap in their respective 
epistemological approaches. In order to streamline my discussion, I will 
primarily focus on Bhaskar’s critique of  “epistemic fallacy,” his differentiation 
between the intransitive and transitive domains of  science, and the idea 
of  stratified reality.8 I will then conclude the article by delineating several 
implications that Bhaskar’s perspective carries not only for the dialogue of  
science and religion, but also the nature of  theological inquiry in relationship 
to critical realism.
Reality Claims and the “Epistemic Fallacy”
To begin with, Bhaskar poses the following deceptively simple question: “What 
must the world be like for science to be possible?”9 In other words, what are 
the transcendental condition(s) required for someone to be able to undertake 
scientific inquiry? Note that by “transcendental condition” we are referring 
not to classical foundationalist presuppositions, i.e. some universal, indubitable 
epistemic postulates, but rather the necessary conditions for X—X standing 
for an activity, practice, etc.—to be conceivable at all.10 For example, we might 
ask, “What is the transcendental condition for something like speech to be 
possible?” Presumably, our response would point to the necessity of  language 
in whatever form, including winking and the crooning of  whales. Now, notice 
how Bhaskar asks what the world, and not the mind, must be like for science 
to work. That simple distinction carries a hefty polemical punch, one that 
aims, quite explicitly, at Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism. On Kant’s 
terms, as one might recall, “any inquiry of  the form ‘what must be the case 
for f to be possible,’ the conclusion, X, would be a fact about us and that 
f must invariably stand for some universal operation of  mind.”11 In short, 
Kant reduces the transcendental question about cognition to epistemology, 
or rather, human subjectivity.
Notwithstanding his sympathies for Kant, Bhaskar diverges from him 
on this point and instead argues that questions of  ontology, rather than those 
of  epistemology, ought to frame our transcendental concerns. In so doing, he 
rejects the subjectivist, “idealist and individualist cast into which Kant pressed 
his own inquiries.”12 That is, he forgoes the focus on the “‘unknowable 
8Critical realism as it applies to Bhaskar’s thought is a contraction of  two 
interrelated lines of  exploration: his “transcendental realism” (philosophy of  science) 
on the one hand and his “critical naturalism” (special philosophy of  human sciences) 
on the other. See Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary 
Philosophy (New York: Verso, 1989), 190.
9Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of  Science (New York: Verso, 2008), 13, 26.
10See Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of  Objects (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities, 
2011), 43. I am indebted to Bryant for some of  the ideas and wording in this paragraph.
11Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of  Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of  the 
Contemporary Human Sciences, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 5.
12Ibid., 5.
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‘noumena’ or things-in-themselves which haunt Kant’s philosophy.” At 
the same time, he “does not dispense with them in the same way as Kant’s 
idealist successors did—by denying that there is a world independent of  the 
knowledge minds may have of  it.”13 He is interested, instead, in the ontological 
conditions that account for the possibility of  knowledge by asking: “What 
must the world be like for science to be possible?”
This form of  argumentation, I should add, is absolutely central to 
Bhaskar’s proposal. It leads him to reject the “epistemic fallacy” and its “failure 
to differentiate ontological from epistemological considerations.”14 Put 
succinctly, the fallacy names unwarranted inferences about the being of  objects 
from our knowledge of  them, in effect allowing epistemology to set the bar for 
what is ontologically real.15 One hears such things regularly, I suspect, when 
teaching undergraduate classes in philosophy, ethics, or related disciplines. 
For example, students will say, “There are so many different, incompatible 
understandings of  A, therefore one true A does not exist.” In other words, 
they reason from the fact of  pluralism to metaphysical or ethical nihilism, 
often couched, rather curiously and paradoxically, in some insipid language 
of  inclusivity and empathy. A similar kind of  logic can be seen, to use a more 
highbrow example, in the case of  logical positivists and their insistence on the 
principle of  verifiability—the claim that propositions that cannot be verified 
or falsified, excluding tautologies, are meaningless statements.16 Here too the 
order of  knowledge is inverted by reducing the reality of  being to the level of  
empirical knowing. 
Bhaskar’s language of intransitive (ontological dimension) and transitive 
(epistemological dimension) aspects of  scientific inquiry mirrors such a 
differentiation of  ontology and epistemology. In regards to the intransitive 
dimension, he reminds us that “knowledge is ‘of ’ things which are not 
produced by men at all: the specific gravity of  mercury, the process of  
13Andrew Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (New 
York: Verso, 1994), 22.
14Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic: The Pulse of  Freedom (New York: Verso, 1993), 138. On 
Kant and critical realism see Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann, eds., The 
Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
15Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 26. For a good summary of  this point see Margaret 
Scotford Archer, Andrew Collier, and Douglas V. Porpora, “Introduction,” in 
Transcendence: Critical Realism and God, ed. Margaret Scotford Archer, Andrew Collier, 
and Douglas V. Porpora (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1. A similar logic is at 
play in Descartes’s Discourse on Method where we have a shift from epistemological 
considerations of  what the we can indubitably know to claims about what is 
essentially real and true, i.e. the mind. On this point see John Cottingham, “General 
Introduction,” in Meditations on First Philosophy, by René Descartes, edited by John 
Cottingham (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xxx.
16Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 27–8.
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electrolysis, the mechanism of  light propagation. None of  these ‘objects of  
knowledge’ depend upon human activity.”17 Namely, 
surface appearances are only the experimental, or empirical, aspect of  
deeper structures and mechanisms which allow the surface appearances to 
be explained, and about which it is possible to gain knowledge. There is thus 
a fundamental ontological distinction to be made between the underlying 
causal mechanisms of  nature and the observable patterns of  events within 
nature, whether these are observed in the natural world itself, or under the 
somewhat more artificial world of  the carefully controlled experiment. The 
underlying causal mechanisms may be said to be the intransitive object 
of  scientific inquiry, whereas the empirical regularities are the transitive 
products of  scientific investigation.18 
Thus even if  we assume, as we ought, that perceptions do not give us 
right representations of  external reality, we should not automatically infer that 
we cannot say anything meaningful about it, or that correspondence theories 
of  truth, even chastised ones, are untenable.19 As Kees van Kooten Niekerk 
rightly notes, conceptualizations of  the world are “constrained by the character 
of  our sensations. Our sensations permit different conceptualizations of  
trees and rivers, but unification of  trees and rivers under one common 
concept would ignore many obvious differences. . . .” In other words, “sense-
experience sets narrow limits to what can be accepted as faithful (or true) 
statements about the (mental or internal) world.”20 
That being said, Bhaskar rightly contends that “any adequate philosophy 
of  science must find a way of  grappling with this central paradox of  science: 
that men in their social activity produce knowledge which is a social product 
much like any other”;21 in other words, it has to account for the transitive 
17Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, 21.
18Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality, vol. 2 (New York: T&T Clark, 
2002), 213.
19For instance, see Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 73. For this reference to Putnam I am indebted 
to Kees van Kooten Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between 
Theology and Science,” in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Epistemological Models 
for the Current Dialogue, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 57.
20Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective,” 57. Similarly, Murphy writes: “While 
concepts are human contrivances and not pictures or representations, they are 
shared by a real world. And given a stable set of  concepts, we can go on to formulate 
sentences, most of  whose criteria for acceptance (or acceptance as true) can best be 
described as a combination of  coherence and empirical adequacy. . . . Given a stable 
conceptual system, truth is, in part, a function of  the way the world is” (Nancey 
Murphy, “The Limits of  Pragmatism and the Limits of  Realism,” Zygon 28 [1993]: 
354, cited in D. Paul La Motagne, Barth and Rationality: Critical Realism in Theology 
[Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012], 47). See also Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 24.
21Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 11. 
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dimension of  knowledge. Such recognition of  the theory-laden, linguistically 
mediated, systemically intertwined, and culturally reflective character of  
knowledge calls for an account of  epistemic fallibilism. Again, this does 
not preclude the possibility of  judgmental rationality about the world, i.e. 
the ability to provide more or less adequate approximation of  what reality 
is really like.22 Philosophical approaches that refuse the very possibility of  
such critical adjudication—including various forms of  subjectivism and anti-
realist constructivism—Bhaskar describes as “endemically aporetic.”23 In that 
regard, he would readily concur with Benedict’s observation that we as human 
beings are “not trapped in a hall of  mirrors of  interpretations; one can and 
must seek a breakthrough to what is really true.”24
On Stratification and Meta-Reality
In addition to these reflections on the relationship of  ontology and 
epistemology, Bhaskar reminds us that different disciplines—physics, 
chemistry, biology, sociology, and so on—have as their focus different strata 
of  reality, each being irreducible to the other.25 Reminiscent of  Aristotle’s 
22Archer, Collier, and Porpora, “Introduction,” 2.
23Roy Bhaskar, Plato Etc.: The Problems of  Philosophy and Their Resolution (New 
York: Verso, 1994), 16. See also Michael Redhead, From Physics to Metaphysics (New 
York: University of  Cambridge, 1995), ch. 2; John R. Searle, The Construction of  
Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995). For a similar assessment in the field 
of  moral philosophy see Samuel Scheffler, “Introduction,” in On What Matters, by 
Derek Parfit, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), xxxiii. Very 
few philosophers, including postmodern ones, actually subscribe to the contention 
that all reality is but a linguistic construct. In fact, postmodern thought, in many of  
its incarnations, simply represents a more radicalized form of  critical realism. Note, 
for example, Umberto Eco’s point: “Even though the interpreters cannot decide 
which interpretation is the privileged one, they can agree on the fact that certain 
interpretations are not contextually legitimated. Thus, even though using a text as 
a playground for implementing unlimited semiosis, they can agree that at certain 
moments the ‘play of  musement’ can transitorily stop by producing a consensual 
judgment. Indeed, symbols grow but do not remain empty” (Umberto Eco, The 
Limits of  Interpretation [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994], 41–2).
24Benedict XVI, “Culture and Truth: Some Reflections on the Encyclical Letter 
Fides et Ratio,” in The Essential Pope Benedict XVI: His Central Writings and Speeches, ed. 
John F. Thornton and Susan B. Varenne (New York: HarperOne, 2007), 368, as cited 
in Ralph Del Colle, “David Bentley Hart and Pope Benedict: Atheist Delusions, the 
Regensburg Lecture, and Beyond,” Nova et Vetera 9, no. 2 (2001): 307.
25For an alternative account of  multi-layered reality see Michael Polanyi, The 
Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1996), 29-32. For this connection to 
Polanyi I am indebted to McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality, 219. Bhaskar notes: “A 
general pattern of  scientific activity emerges from this. When a stratum of  reality has 
been adequately described the next step consists in the discovery of  the mechanisms 
responsible for behavior at that level. The key move in this involves the postulation 
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emphasis on the interdependence of  ontology and methodology, Bhaskar 
points out that “only the concept of  ontological depth can reveal the actual 
historical stratification of  the sciences as anything other than an accident. For 
this can now be seen as grounded in the multi-tiered stratification of  reality, 
and the consequent logic-of-discovery that stratification imposes on science.”26 
Such an ontology of  stratified emergence has numerous implications, not least 
of  which is the idea that methodology in the sciences cannot be encapsulated 
in a priori foundationalist points of  departure. It is the object or strata that 
“determines the form of  its possible science.”27 It stands to reason, therefore, 
that “each scientific discipline demands an approach to its subject area which 
is determined by its own distinctive features—a notion which is encapsulated 
in the Greek phrase kata physin, ‘according to its own nature.’”28 
The concept of  “emergent order” that Bhaskar articulates here bears 
similarities to the philosophical notion of  “supervenience” according to 
which “higher-level properties supervene on lower-level properties if  they 
are partially constituted by the lower-level properties but are not directly 
reducible to them.”29 One simply cannot, for example, explain various forms 
of  social interaction by looking at leptons or brain scans of  the prefrontal 
orbital cortex.30 Instead, “emergent phenomena are frequently taken to be 
irreducible, to be unpredictable or unexplainable, to require novel concepts, 
and to be holistic.”31 Such principle of  emergence prevents one from 
of  hypothetical entities and mechanisms, whose reality can then be ascertained. 
Such entities need not be smaller in size, though in physics and chemistry this has 
normally proved to be the case” (Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 169).
26Bhaskar, The Possibility of  Naturalism, 14. For this reference to Bhaskar I am 
indebted to James K. Dew, Science and Theology: An the Assessment of  Alister McGrath’s 
Critical Realist Perspective (Eugene, OR: Wipf  and Stock, 2010), 109–10.
27Bhaskar, The Possibility of  Naturalism, 3. 
28Alister E. McGrath, The Science of  God: An Introduction to Scientific Theology 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 18.
29Nancey C. Murphy and G. F. Rayner Ellis, On the Moral Nature of  the Universe: 
Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 22–3.
30The pluralistic aspect in the sciences can also be seen in the tendency “towards 
a diversification of  conceptualities, methods, approaches, paradigms, and cognitive 
values. A discipline like biology, for instance, is organized in historical as well as 
in experimental departments, and among its methods defined historical inference, 
morphological descriptions, chemical analysis, refinement [or critique] of  the theory-
structure of  Darwinism, and so on. Hence, even within the natural sciences disunity 
has indeed become a matter of  fact” (Niels Henrik Gergersen and J. Wentzel van 
Huyssteen, “Introduction,” in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current 
Dialogue, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen [Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1998], 3–4).
31Mark Bedau and Paul Humphreys, “Introduction to Philosophical Perspectives 
on Emergence,” in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, ed. Mark 
Bedau and Paul Humphreys (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 9.
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settling on any particular, all-encompassing method of  investigating the 
different strata.32 What is needed, instead, is an allowance for polysyllabic 
or multileveled accounts of  reality whose ontological “depth” may never be 
descriptively exhausted.33 
It is in this context that Bhaskar proposes his concept of  meta-reality 
that connotes “both the idea of  transcendence, that is going to a level beyond 
or behind and between reality, while at the same time the ‘reality’ in the title 
makes it clear that this level is still real, and so part of  the very same totality 
that critical realism has been describing all along.”34 That is to say, meta-reality 
names attempts to capture the unified nature of  things, a sense of  wholeness 
that eludes normal scientific inquiry. The evocation of  transcendence here, 
as Bhaskar understands, it not a matter of  arbitrary fiat, but rather describes 
the grammar of  a critically astute re-enchantment of  reality against various 
forms of  modernistic or naturalistic reductionism. Of  course, such turn 
to transcendence, and with it the discourse of  the “whole” and “limits,” is 
not only the provenance of  religion; non-theistic philosophers such as Iris 
Murdoch too have argued that the idea of  transcendence is synchronous with 
both ordinary human experience and science.35 “The idea of  a self-contained 
unity or limited whole,” Murdoch writes, “is a fundamental instinctive 
concept. We see parts of  things, we intuit whole things. . . . The urge to prove 
that where we intuit unity there really is unity is a deep emotional motive to 
philosophy, to art, to thinking itself.”36
While much more could be said about Bhaskar’s particular brand of  
critical realism, even our limited discussion is suggestive of  implications his 
approach might have not only for the dialogue of  science and religion, but 
also questions of  theological method. In the section to follow, I will briefly 
explore six such areas of  interest.
32Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 171. This is in contrast to Edward O. Wilson who 
claims that “we are approaching a new age of  synthesis, when the testing of  
consilience is the greatest of  all intellectual challenges. Philosophy, the contemplation 
of  the unknown, is a shrinking dominion. We have the common goal of  turning as 
much philosophy as possible into science” (Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity 
of  Knowledge [New York: Knopf, 1998], 10). 
33For a helpful delineation of  concept of  “depth” see Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics 
as a Guide to Morals (New York: Penguin, 1993), 55.
34Roy Bhaskar, Meta-Reality: The Philosophy of  Meta-Reality (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 2002), 175. For this reference to Bhaskar I am indebted to Alister McGrath, 
The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 52.
35For an excellent discussion of  transcendence in contemporary thought see 
Regina M. Schwartz, ed., Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the 
Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2004).
36Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 1.
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The Dialogue of  Science and Religion: Some Tentative Proposals
1. Bhaskar’s double entendre on epistemic mimesis, i.e. the idea that 
knowledge while pointing to reality is always somehow conditioned, entails a 
word of  caution to both practitioners of  science and theology. All forms of  
inquiry, as van Huyssteen points out, “share alike the groping and tentative 
tools of  humankind: words, ideas, and images that have been handed 
down and which we refashion and reinterpret for our context in light of  
contemporary experience.”37 It is that recognition, in fact, that gives “science 
a degree of  kinship with other forms of  human enquiry.”38 Consequently, 
someone operating from the perspective of  Bhaskar’s theoretical starting 
point will be critical of  the proverbial fact/value distinction and the implied 
empiricist reductionism of  what constitutes “true” knowledge. Iris Murdoch 
rightly reminds us, for example, that “almost all of  our concepts and activities 
involve evaluation. In the majority of  cases, a survey of  the facts will itself  
involve moral discrimination. Innumerable forms of  evaluation haunt our 
simplest decisions.”39 In that sense she would concur with Nietzsche’s 
insistence, as would I, that truth requires a “training in truthfulness.” It also 
requires “self-critical honesty” given that the pursuit of  truth leads us into a 
“complex and uneven terrain where influences, prejudices, doubts, histories, 
loves, emotions, politics, experiences all jostle for a fair hearing. There is no 
one systematic rationality that can accommodate all of  this.”40 That applies to 
all forms of  knowing, including science and theology.
2. Both critical realism and theological inquiry have a share in their mutual 
commitment to the ontological intransitivity of  reality. While precluding forms 
of  naïve correspondence theory of  truth, as referential discourses they both 
reject the argument that descriptions of  reality amount to little more than 
solipsistic projections or putative truth statements furtively twisted to conform 
to a scientist’s agenda.41 After all, “theological propositions about the world 
37Wentzel Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of  Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in 
Theology and Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 218.
38See John C. Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of  the Writings 
of  Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne (London: SPCK, 1996), 4. 
39Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 26. Murdoch, in other words, 
contends that “facts on their own, understood as discrete pieces of  data, do not 
constitute a neutral truth which is capable of  conveying some sense of  meaning or 
saying anything essential about the world. They are not inert but connected to value 
by individual (moral) judgment, an unavoidable and continuing mode of  evaluation 
and knowledge” (Heather Widdows, The Moral Vision of  Iris Murdoch [Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2005], 60).
40Giles Fraser, “On the Genealogy of  Morals, Part 7: Nietzsche Contra 
Dogma,” Cif  Belief, The Guardian, December 8, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2008/dec/08/nietzsche-part-seven.
41See for example Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social 
Construction of  Scientific Facts, vol. 80, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1986).
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concern the same real world as scientific statements,”42 which in turn reminds 
us that Christianity, in distinction to some other religions, is unintelligible 
apart from its reality claims. That is why a critical realist theology—or at least 
a Christian theology sympathetic to the ontological intransitivity tenet of  
Bhaskar’s critical realism—will spurn proposals that define religion as being 
only a meaning-generating endeavor (à la Peter Berger’s “sacred canopy”).43 
3. While Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism provides a helpful theoretical 
framework for addressing the dialogue of  science and religion, we need 
additional specificity concerning the character of  rationality informing such 
a dialogue. In that regard, van Huyssteen’s nonfoundationalist critical realism 
provides invaluable suggestions. Building on Calvin Schrag, Huyssteen’s 
approach accords a prominent role to “transversal rationality,” i.e. a form of  
reasoning “where our multiple beliefs and practices, our habits of  thought 
and attitudes, our prejudices and assessments, converge.”44 Transversality, in 
other words, enables us to envision spaces of  convergence hospitable to both 
personal convictions and interdisciplinary normative judgments informed 
by the criteria of  “intelligibility and optimal understanding, responsible 
judgment, progressive problem-solving, and experiential adequacy.”45 How 
this might work out in practice is a whole different issue, one that goes 
beyond the purview of  this article. Pointing to an exciting area of  exploration, 
however, I would suggest that much could be gained from juxtaposing 
van Huyssteen’s conception of  rationality and Hans Georg Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics, particularly his notion of  “fusion of  horizons” 
(Horizontverschmelzung).46 Exploring the dialectics of  epistemology and 
hermeneutics, knowing and understanding, might open new ways for science 
and religion to interact in a truly transdisciplinary fashion. Ursula King shares 
such sentiments when she notes that 
a “fusion of  horizons” will lead to larger horizons, to new views and shared 
understanding. This fusion is also important for the dialogue between 
science and religion, and it is likely to be far more creative and holistic 
than advocating a strongly adversarial stance between these universes of  
discourse and knowing. . . . Fusing and expanding the horizons of  both 
42Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective,” 78. 
43See Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of  a Sociological Theory of  Religion 
(New York: Doubleday, 1967), especially ch. 1 and 2.
44Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of  Rationality, 136. Calvin Schrag popularized the 
concept of  “transversal rationality” in his The Resources of  Rationality: A Response to the 
Postmodern Challenge (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), particularly 
ch. 6. 
45Ibid., 12. For a good discussion of  this issue see Kenneth A. Reynhout, “The 
Evolution of  van Huyssteen’s Model of  Rationality,” in The Evolution of  Rationality: 
Interdisciplinary Essays in Honor of  J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, ed. Wentzel Van Huyssteen 
and F. LeRon Shults (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 7–12.
46Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 
1989), 302–7.
365THE QUEST FOR “LA SAPIENZA” . . .
science and religion through creative dialogue from many perspectives 
could be of  immense benefit for humankind.47
4. The affirmation of  transversal rationality implies additional levels of  
opportunity and responsibility. For one, theology must refrain from laissez-
faire special pleadings when its specific reality claims are being questioned. I 
think that this needs to be stressed—particularly in the Adventist context—as 
there is a tendency at times to shield the authority of  the Bible and privileged 
hermeneutical approaches from the onslaught of  science by resorting to a 
curious type of  epistemological nihilism. Not infrequently, theology attempts 
to insulate itself  from criticism by piggybacking on those accounts that define 
religion as a protected domain. Such shielding comes through stratagems of  
subjectivization, demythologization, and “cultural-linguistic”48 sequestering 
of  either the Kantian, Hegelian, Wittgensteinian, or some other variety, at 
times bordering on the disingenuous. We cannot stress enough, therefore, 
that the dialogue between science and religion needs to commence with a 
high degree of  respect for scientific inquiry and a willingness, in principle, to 
be corrected and changed. It is true that scientific theories are often fraught 
with ideological overlays, in the same way that theological interpretations are. 
Yet, theology ought not to hide behind the sophistry of  perpetual deferment, 
one that implicitly claims, “We will accept scientific discoveries once or as 
long as they fit our doctrinal bill.” Caution and critical distance are prudent; 
equivocation and intellectual dishonesty are not. Niekerk is thus correct in 
reminding us that
theology has an interest in science with regards to the performance of  its 
proper task. The reason is the critical realist assignment of  theology. This 
assignment involves the task of  subjecting the realist claims of  particular 
versions of  a Christian worldview to a critical assessment, and in order to 
do so theology has to take into account the compatibility of  those claims 
with science. . . . [A] serious consideration of  the scientific understanding 
of  the natural world is part of  the critical assignment of  a theology that 
purports to be realistic.49
5. A theology sympathetic to critical realism will concur that reality 
cannot be reduced to any particular strata or to a particular scientific method. 
47Ursula King, “The Journey beyond Athens and Jerusalem,” Zygon 40, no. 
3 (September 2005): 538. For the reference to King I am indebted to Kenneth 
A. Reynhout, “The Hermeneutics of  Transdisciplinarity: A Gadamerian Model 
of  Transversal Reasoning,” http://www.metanexus.net/essay/hermeneutics-
transdisciplinarity-gadamerian-model-transversal-reasoning. While the suggestion 
to explore the relationship of  van Huyssteen and Gadamer is a product of  my own 
research, I am grateful to Reynhout for directing me to important resources and 
possible avenues of  exploration.
48I am adapting George Lindbeck’s term here to name a canopy of  fideistic 
approaches to religion and theology. For Lindbeck’s delineation of  the concept 
see The Nature of  Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1984), 40–1.
49Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective,” 80–1.
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Of  course, this raises all kinds of  questions, including the place of  philosophy 
and theology in the stratification of  reality. Murphy, for example, proposes 
a hierarchy of  sciences where metaphysics/theology ends up on top as 
the most generalized approach to reality. In that context, theology will be 
interested in accounts that point to the “depth” of  reality—here variously 
understood as the “ground of  being” or “inexhaustible mystery”—while fully 
acknowledging that the idea of  “depth” need not be stated in theistic terms. 
Equally important, I believe, is the claim that theology is also horizontally 
related to the various strata. In that sense, “critical realism encourages a 
connectivist approach to theology, by insisting that its correlation with the 
various strata of  reality be explored, both as a means of  intellectual enrichment 
and as a matter of  intellectual responsibility.”50 Such an affirmation opens up 
a whole new space for a chastised natural theology, one that is demonstrative 
rather than prescriptive. It privileges the language of  inferences, fittingness, 
and resonances as it probes perennial human interests in the idea of  
transcendent in relationship to human well-being. With that in mind, I concur 
with Benedict’s insistence that a principle task of  philosophy and theology is 
to “sift the non-scientific element out of  the scientific results with which it is 
often entangled, thus keeping open our awareness of  the totality and of  the 
broader dimensions of  the reality of  human existence—or science can never 
show us more than partial aspects of  this existence.”51 
6. Finally, Bhaskar’s recognition of  the transitive domain and the way 
human cognition is shaped by individual, institutional, and cultural factors, 
pushes the discussion of  science and religion, invariably so, into the domain 
of  ethics. That is, the scope of  the dialogue must go beyond matters of  
metaphysics and epistemology to include the issue of  moral responsibility. 
The ethical dimension itself  consists of  two, broadly-construed layers. On 
the first level we are confronted with questions of  (mis)conduct of  scientific 
research, including matters of  institutional negligence, deliberate fabrication 
of  data, intentional omission of  all known data, authorship and intellectual 
property, use of  animals and human subjects, and so on.52 Now, of  course, I 
do not mean to suggest that all such considerations somehow need a religious 
perspective in order to be illuminating and ethically directing. I do, however, 
maintain the position that some of  these questions press against deeper 
frameworks of  meaning and metaphysics. As anyone interested in the field 
of  moral philosophy will readily admit, the moment you focus on matters of  
applied ethics, questions of  metaphysics begin looming in the background.
50McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality, 240.
51Ratzinger and Habermas, Dialectics of  Secularization, 56–7.
52John D’Angelo, Ethics in Science: Ethical Misconduct in Scientific Research (New 
York: CRC, 2012). He discusses issues such as institutional negligence, deliberate 
fabrication of  data, deliberate omission of  all known data, authorship and intellectual 
property, etc. Also see Bernard E. Rollin, Science and Ethics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) for a good treatment of  how ethics is often ignored to the 
detriment of  science and society.
367THE QUEST FOR “LA SAPIENZA” . . .
The second level, on the other hand, addresses the questions of  
consequences and utilization. I am reminded here of  the important claim that 
Glenn Stassen and David P. Gushee make in their Kingdom Ethics where they 
caution about the science-technology-commerce connection that both exerts 
pressure on our moral sensibilities and urgently invites ethical deliberations.53 
To overlook the connection of  science and capital is as negligent as it is 
naïve. I do not need to dwell here on the usual stock of  ethical quandaries 
connected with environmental degradation, biotechnology, trans-humanism, 
nuclear armament, and so on. What I do want to reiterate is, however, the 
need for the faith and science dialogue to encompass efforts to articulate 
goods, norms, and judgments that are, in Hans Jonas’s words, “compatible 
with the permanence of  genuine human life.”54 It is to insist that ethics 
cannot be removed from the conversation table as it points to the essential 
task of  constructing moral ontologies that account “of  the meaning of  our 
being in the world and how to orient ourselves in the world.”55 In other words, 
it is to reject the severance of  scientific and technological development from 
fundamental “questions of  integral human development.”56 Murphy helpfully 
notes:
We claim that ethical knowledge is logically related to knowledge about the 
way the world is as well as to knowledge of  transcendent reality. Thus, ethical 
judgments should be affected by developments in scientific knowledge but 
cannot be determined by scientific knowledge alone. This is the limited truth 
in the fact-value distinction . . . . Furthermore, we claim that sciences are 
not “value-free”; the applied human sciences provide knowledge of  means-
ends relations, and choice of  ends presumes judgments about the good for 
humanity. Since the natural sciences are dependent on the development of  
technology (applied science) they to are inevitably tied to the ethical realm.57 
It stands to reason, therefore, that faith practitioners concerned about 
science and theology ought to be supportive of  organizations and efforts that 
seek to bring scientists and human rights advocates to the same table. (The 
Carnegie Mellon University Center for Human Rights Science is one such 
laudatory forum. It “brings together scientists and human rights practitioners 
committed to rigorous assessment of  the state of  human rights around the 
world”).58
53See Glenn H. Stassen and David P. Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in the 
Contemporary Context (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2003), 257–8.
54Hans Jonas, The Imperative of  Responsibility: In Search of  an Ethics for the 
Technological Age (Chicago: The University of  Chicago Press, 1984), 11.
55William Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 38.
56Benedict XVI, Charity in Truth (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2009), 20–37.
57Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of  the Universe, 6.
58“Center for Human Rights Science - Carnegie Mellon University,” http://
www.cmu.edu/chrs/.
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In closing, we return to Benedict’s reminder that what our civilization 
urgently needs is the pursuit of  integrated or sapiential rationality; a kind of  
“cosmopolis” (Stephen Toulmin) that convincingly recaptures the mediaeval 
vision of  “an over all harmony between the order of  the heavens (the 
Cosmos) and the order of  human affairs (Polis).”59 As Murphy and Ellis claim, 
there is a great hunger today “to relate our burgeoning knowledge of  the 
cosmos to the pursuit of  human meaning, both in the sense of  meaningful, 
fulfilling ways of  life (ethics and politics) and in the sense of  the quest for an 
understanding of  ultimate reality (religion).”60 Benedict strongly echoes this 
point in Caritas in Veritate where he warns against the instrumentalization of  
reason that severs scientific discoveries and technological development from 
matters of  moral responsibility, virtue, and human rights. “When technology 
is allowed to take over,” he argues, “the result is confusion between ends and 
means, such that the sole criterion for action in businesses is thought to be the 
maximization of  profit, in politics the consolidation of  power, and in science 
the findings of  research.” What is frequently overlooked is that “underneath 
the intricacies of  economic, financial, and political interconnections, there 
remain misunderstandings, hardships, and injustice.”61 Addressing such 
issues of  systemic injustice and imbalance is a complicated endeavor, one 
that requires both different forms of  advocacy and scholarly explorations. 
But certainly one legitimate way to pursue such a task is to strive to bring 
faith and reason together, to “overcome the self-imposed limitation of  reason 
to the empirically falsifiable” and “so continually [seek to] disclose its vast 
horizons.”62 The quest for la sapienza or wisdom is more, but certainly not 
less than that.
59Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of  the Universe, 2.
60Ibid., 2–3.
61Benedict, Charity in Truth, 143.
62Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University.”
